Predators from KGBistan: May 26, 2003 - The report on State and Oligarchy
All the oligarchs remained loyal to the chekist junta except the only one Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who after 10 years of brutal imprisonment and seizure of assets dedicated himself to opposition activism
WHO CREATED putin? ENG / ITA / RUS: Who helped, lobbied, collaborated, still helping, still collaborating and still sponsoring chekist regime?
Russian Opposition: Who, What and How ENG/ ITA/ RUS: The History of Protests, Soviet Dissidents and Opposition Leaders.
Russian Government vs. Russian people ENG/ ITA/ RUS: 35+ texts: articles, songs, speeches, WikiLeaks, Video
KGBistan: Who, What and How ENG/ ITA/ RUS: What do you know about regime in Russia?
Why did the Liberal Democratic West choose putin? Transnational mafia of ruling elites and project "putinism" ENG/ ITA/ RUS: Who, when, for how much and how often: how the Western establishment raised the chekist junta, enriched itself with stolen resources
Leggere in italiano: Predators from KGBistan: 26 maggio 2003 - Il rapporto sullo Stato e l'Oligarchia
Kremlin vs. Citizens: 2003-2023 - Minimum pension's growth from 65 to 120 euros
WHO CREATED putin? ENG / ITA / RUS: Who helped, lobbied, collaborated, still helping, still collaborating and still sponsoring chekist regime? Russian Opposition: Who, What and How ENG/ ITA/ RUS: The History of Protests, Soviet Dissidents and Opposition Leaders.
Translation:
«Доклад Белковского»: государство vs. олигархия
| Stanislav Belkovskiy | National Council for the strategy | 26.05.2003 |
“Belkovsky Report”: State vs. oligarchy
On May 26, 2003, the online platform Utro.ru published a report by the National Strategy Council, a non-profit organization that included a number of Russian political experts, one of the founders and general director of which was the political strategist and publicist Stanislav Belkovsky. The report was called “State and Oligarchy,” but the publication was entitled “An oligarchic coup is being prepared in Russia,” which quite accurately reflected the alarmist nature of the text. His main idea was that an oligarchic coup is brewing in Russia, as representatives of super-large businesses strive to occupy leadership positions in the state, and not just cooperate with the authorities in economic terms. In addition, it was reported that the plans of the oligarchs allegedly include a desire to significantly limit presidential power and transform Russia from a presidential republic into a presidential-parliamentary one. The oligarchs named in the report were Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Fridman, Oleg Deripaska, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Potanin and Andrei Melnichenko.
On July 2, 2003, the arrest of Platon Lebedev marked the formal beginning of the “YUKOS case,” and many commentators were inclined to connect the publication of the NSC report with the beginning of the subsequent attack on Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Stanislav Belkovsky, one of the authors of the report “State and Oligarchy,” commented specifically on the context and consequences of the appearance of this text for this publication.
They say about me that I put Mikhail Khodorkovsky in prison.
This version is quite honorable for me: imprisoning a man who at that time was the richest and one of the most influential in the country is not given to everyone.
But, unfortunately (for me), it is incorrect. The authors of the version refer to the report “State and Oligarchy” published in May 2003, the authorship of which is attributed, again somewhat erroneously, to me. In fact, that text was prepared by 11 experts from the public organization “National Strategy Council” (SNS). Including me, but no more than “including”.
The initiator of the report was the co-chairman of the SNA, Doctor of Economic Sciences Iosif Diskin. The main idea of the text: it is necessary to leave the trajectory of oligarchic modernization and awaken the sleeping forces of civil society. (Which, I note, have since fallen into eternal sleep, but that’s a completely different story.)
In the report, as befits a scandalous freak, I was responsible for something fried that would appeal to the general public. There was hot information that under the wing of Mr. Khodorkovsky, a concept was being developed for transforming Russia into a parliamentary republic, in which he would occupy the post of prime minister (head of the federal government).
In those glorious days, all of Moscow was talking about this, and there was no special secret: the developers of the concept almost proudly considered themselves to be part of the community of people changing the RF system.
As soon as Khodorkovsky’s key partner Platon Lebedev was taken into custody in the Apatit JSC case on July 2, 2003, the concept, according to the old joke, changed: YUKOS circles immediately publicly declared that a parliamentary republic headed by MBKh would never and under no circumstances was planned. And Belkovsky is to blame for everything, to whom Igor Sechin (then deputy head of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, now the head of Rosneft OJSC) ordered a raid on the most transparent and efficient corporation in Russia.
We discussed this topic with MBKh [abbr. from - Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky] himself - after his release from prison - in detail. And they agreed that I didn’t imprison him. Because in Russia no one is ever imprisoned because of reports and other theoretical fabrications. The whole issue is fierce political and economic competition. If you are guaranteed not to become a prisoner, never become a Russian billionaire with political and other humanitarian ambitions.
My “victim” and I did not become friends, but we did not turn out to be enemies either.
This is how the epic with the mythologized “State and Oligarchy” ended.
State and oligarchy
I. Introduction
The spring of 2003 was marked by the beginning of a qualitatively new process for modern Russia. The ruling oligarchic layer <...> began preparing the transformation of the country's government with the aim of ensuring a personal union between super-large businesses and the executive branch. In fact, the country found itself on the verge of a creeping oligarchic coup.
It can be stated that the oligarchs, having completed the initial privatization of the main objects of the national economy, moved on to a kind of privatization of the political and power space of Russia. In such a situation, the institution of the country's president as the basis of the political system of post-Soviet Russia, from the guarantor of stability of the ruling layer, which it was in 1992–2002, turns into a potential obstacle to final monopolization <...> and a possible threat to the logic of oligarchic modernization.
In this regard, the philosophy and technology of interaction between the state and the oligarchy in Russia inevitably become objects of priority attention. And the search for an alternative to oligarchic modernization (the latter can in many ways be called quasi-modernization) is a very significant, if not key, element of the national strategy.
II. Problems of interaction between the state and the oligarchy in the context of national strategy
The development of a national strategy for Russia requires clarity regarding the oligarchy, its role and place in the modern development of our country. The significance of this problem was emphasized already in the first NSC report “The Great Game in Russia: Subjects of National Strategy” (November 2002), where the modern development of Russia was characterized as oligarchic modernization. In turn, oligarchic modernization can be characterized as an integral part of imposed development, in the grip of which the country has been since the early 90s of the 20th century. <...>
III. Definition of oligarchy in relation to modern Russia. Development of Russian statehood at the beginning of the 21st century: historical analogies
Recently (2000–2003) both in the media and, more remarkably, in the expert community, the term “oligarch” began to be used as a synonym for a big businessman or even just a rich person. In this regard, the boundaries of perception of the concept of “oligarch” have become very unclear.
The National Strategy Council believes that an oligarch is a subject of a certain power system that has developed in Russia over the last decade of the 20th century. <...> Oligarchy is the power of a few. In this sense, a Russian oligarch does not have to be a businessman at all: he is an individual who meets certain criteria of the ruling caste (ruling stratum). The number of oligarchs is constant over time; today it is impossible to become an oligarch without the consent of all - or at least a qualified majority - of the subjects of the oligarchic pool (ruling layer).
Based on these definitions, oligarchs can be considered, for example:
Roman Abramovich
Mikhail Fridman
Oleg Deripaska
Mikhail Khodorkovsky
Vladimir Potanin
Andrey Melnichenko and so on.
and cannot be considered, for example:
Vladimir Evtushenkov
Kahu Bendukidze
Oleg Kiselev
Anatoly Karachinsky and so on.
The oligarchic layer was formed outside the framework of market mechanisms. The conclave of oligarchs was created on the basis of subjective decisions of the Kremlin made in 1993-1999. The basis for the formation of the oligarchic conclave was the process of privatization: the presidential government transferred the most attractive properties (primarily industrial and infrastructure) on Russian territory to the subjects of this conclave almost free of charge.
Let's compare the amounts for which the future oligarchs purchased the largest properties on the territory of the Russian Federation with today's capitalization / profitability indicators of these objects.
A controlling stake in NK YUKOS (78%) was purchased at a loans-for-shares auction by the MENATEP group, controlled by M. Khodorkovsky and his partners, in 1995 for $350 million. Already in 1997, shortly after the start of public trading in YUKOS shares, the market capitalization of the corporation reached $9 billion. Currently (before the recent announcement of the merger deal with Sibneft), the capitalization of NK YUKOS was close to $15 billion.
In November 1995, the Interros group (V. Potanin) acquired a controlling stake in RAO Norilsk Nickel at a loans-for-shares auction for $170.1 million. According to official reports, in 2001 the net profit of Norilsk Nickel alone amounted to about $1 billion. The corporation's capitalization exceeds $10 billion.
In December 1995, a loans-for-shares auction was held to sell the government's stake (51%) in the shares of NK Sibneft. The package was purchased by the tandem "Oil Financial Company" (the company was founded by firms controlled by B. Berezovsky and R. Abramovich) - "Capital Savings Bank", which offered the government $100.3 million. In 2000, the net profit of the Sibneft company amounted to $674.8 million. The fortune of R. Abramovich, who until recently solely controlled Sibneft, according to Forbes magazine in 2003, amounted to $5.7 billion.
The quantitative and qualitative composition of the oligarchs can only change on the basis of a joint decision of the conclave (examples: the expulsion of Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky from the ruling layer, the adoption of the owner of MDM Bank Andrei Melnichenko) or as a result of the revolutionary redistribution of large property in the country (during the reign of vladimir putin is not possible).
It should be noted that, taking into account the above, the model of functioning of the oligarchy in Russia is approaching the Venetian Republic of the 13th–18th centuries. [The oligarchs play the role of the Council of Ten, and the president they elect (de facto) plays the role of the Doge.]
Venice of the 13th–18th centuries is a striking historical precedent for oligarchic rule. Researchers associate the formation of the republic with the so-called Serrata (closing of access to the Great Council - 1297), after which the functions of government were concentrated in the hands of about two hundred patrician families. In the 14th century, the trend towards the isolation of the elite continued: in 1315, the so-called Golden Book was compiled, which included the names of 200 families of the ruling oligarchy. The republic existed for exactly five centuries - in 1797 the city fell under the attacks of the troops of Napoleon Bonaparte. Beginning in the 15th century, the idea of Venice as a repressive state, rigidly governed by a degenerating and secretive oligarchy, became widespread. Venice, with its completely closed “caste” of nobles by birth (comprising approximately 2% of the population), no longer seemed like a stronghold of republicanism, but a hopeless anachronism.
For a long period, the Venetian patriciate was distinguished by: colossal capital acquired in trade and usury operations; consolidation of the interests of the ruling layer; a unified model of economic and political management based on the experience of managing joint colonial enterprises. The strategy of the Venetian oligarchy in relation to the poorest segments of the population consisted mainly in bribery (carnival distribution of social bonuses - “gifts”), providing a spectacular and entertaining complex of social life (famous carnivals, which also had foreign policy functions of demonstrating power), as well as organizing employment for a significant part of the population. All researchers talk about a radical polarization of wealth: several hundred families controlled almost all the national wealth of the republic.
The Grand Council, the supreme body of the republic, which included representatives of the 200 families of the Golden Book, had legislative power, elected and appointed all magistrates and commissions of trust, and also chose the supreme ruler - the doge. The administrative and administrative core of the system was a narrower council (Senate), as well as a large bureaucratic office - several tens of thousands of people with an average historical population of about 200 thousand people. Above the republican government in Venice formally stood the head of the monarchical type - the doge. Over time, the status of the doge became increasingly formalized, it was enclosed in a whole network of ceremonial restrictions. The true power center of the republic was the so-called Council of Ten, formed by the top of the oligarchy. He had the broadest powers, monitored all officials, using the services of an army of spies and informers, and secretly condemned to death the enemies of the republic.
A special resource was the transit geo-economic position of Venice: the republic received direct monetary and indirect political-status rent from the flow of goods moving between Europe, Asia and Africa through the territories under its control. The foreign policy role of Venice noticeably decreased in the 16th century due to the objective process of shifting a number of trade routes to the Atlantic, the opening of a sea route to India, as well as the strengthening of France, Britain and Spain. This was largely due to the degradation of the ruling layer. When, in the late era of the republic’s existence, the practical benefits of the oligarchy came into conflict with considerations of the republic’s prestige and its geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean, this was the beginning of the end of the regime.
<...>
The oligarchic layer in modern Russia has developed a certain system of basic values.
This system, with a certain degree of accuracy, can be called anti-national. It should be noted that, as subjects of the Russian economy, oligarchs act mainly as foreign investors. Oligarchic property in Russia is registered in the name of foreign legal entities, mainly offshore companies.
This is connected not only, as is commonly believed, with solving problems of optimizing taxation and corporate financial flows in general, but also with the fact that, in the collective understanding of the oligarchs, a foreign owner in Russia is protected significantly better than a domestic one. We can say that the oligarchs consciously or unconsciously appeal to the resources of other states as guarantors of their interests in the political and economic space of Russia.
A few typical examples.
In June 2002, NK YUKOS published a list of the company's largest shareholders. Group MENATEP Limited (an offshore company registered in Gibraltar) owns 100% of the shares of Yukos Universal Limited, which, in turn, owned 3.54% of Yukos shares as of June 10, 2002, and its division Hulley Enterprises Limited - another 57.47 %. Thus, the offshore Group MENATEP controls approximately 61% of YUKOS shares. According to experts, M. Khodorkovsky de facto controls 59.5% of the votes in Group MENATEP.
On October 24, 2001, a group of the main shareholders of NK Sibneft transferred into the ownership of the British company Millhouse Capital the assets of a number of the largest enterprises and companies in Russia, in particular, 50% of the shares of the Russian Aluminum Corporation and 88% of the shares of Sibneft. According to numerous sources, Millhouse Capital is de facto controlled by R. Abramovich.
An example of a direct appeal to the legitimizing support of Western state institutions is the recent high-profile deal between Alfa Group and British Petroleum. On February 11, 2003, British Petroleum announced its decision to create the NewCo oil holding together with Alfa Group and Access/Renova. The transaction amount ($6.75 billion) is comparable to the annual volume of foreign direct investment in Russia. NewCo will combine the oil assets of Alfa Group and Access/Renova, as well as the Russian projects of British Petroleum. In the structure of the new company, shares will be distributed equally: 50% will belong to foreigners, and 50% to TNCs. All procedures for the conclusion will be finally completed by June 2003.
It should also be noted that the families of most oligarchs permanently live outside of Russia, and their heirs study abroad. There is much to indicate that the majority of the oligarchy does not connect personal and family strategic interests with Russia as a geopolitical and ethnocultural entity.
The continuation of the large-scale export of capital outside Russia is explained not only by the peculiarities of the country’s investment climate, but also by the basic ideas of the oligarchy about personal/family (family) strategy. This strategy is usually associated with the West and almost never with Russia.
The massive export of capital is the economic correlate of such value systems. The export of capital from Russia from 1990 to 1998, according to open sources, amounted to about $150 billion. In 2000, according to existing information, the export of capital reached $25 billion, and subsequently this level did not decrease, despite the declared stabilization of the political and economic situation and relative improvement of the investment climate in Russia.
Important elements of the oligarchic value system are:
hedonism;
the cult of money as a tool of power;
deliberate disregard for people outside oligarchic corporations and their vital interests.
The latter property can also be designated as oligarchic autism. Representatives of the ruling layer of modern Russia are inclined to believe that the interests of the majority of the people should not be taken into account at all when forming / formulating state strategy and a system of corporate strategies, since the Russian people (and this, according to the ideologists of oligarchic capitalism, has been proven, in particular, by Joseph Stalin) is supposedly inherent unlimited patience with overwhelming force. The simple idea that any of the oligarchs could become a victim of their own security guard is simply brushed aside by representatives of the ruling layer. Another formula of “oligarchic autism”: everything that happens outside the system of interests and values of our layer is absolutely not significant, either tactically or strategically.
IV. Post-Soviet state: genesis and reproduction of oligarchy
The post-Soviet state proclaimed - partly explicitly, partly implicitly - liberalism as the ideological basis of its activities.
The implementation of the liberal doctrine was intended to create equal conditions for the development of people's abilities, entrepreneurship and initiative. Important stages in the applied implementation of this doctrine were the liberalization of prices, the privatization of the main, most profitable and least in need of large-scale capital-intensive reconstruction part of state property, and a radical reduction in the role of the state in economic life. The Soviet social contract, which guaranteed minimum socio-economic guarantees in exchange for socio-political loyalty, was immediately terminated.
At the same time, the state turned out to be unable to ensure the non-crisis nature of the socio-economic transformation, maintain decent living conditions for the majority of the population, and guarantee equality of rights for economic entities. The use of shadow mechanisms of influence has ensured a concentration of capital unprecedented in modern times.
At the beginning of August 2002, the Financial Times published an article “Russia's Growing Tycoons.” The newspaper refers to an analytical report by Peter Boone and Denis Rodionov, employees of the Moscow office of the investment bank UBS Brunswick Warburg.
“By analyzing the activities of 64 of the largest Russian companies that are no longer controlled by the state, we found that 85% of their capital is in the hands of just eight groups of shareholders” (Boon-Rodionov).
We are talking about the following groups, personified by the heads of corporations: Mikhail Khodorkovsky (YUKOS), Vladimir Potanin (Interros), Mikhail Fridman (Alfa Group), Oleg Deripaska (Russian Aluminum, Basic Element), Roman Abramovich (“Russian Aluminum”, “Sibneft”). Of the 64 largest Russian companies, which had a turnover of $109 billion in 2000, $47 billion comes from state-controlled companies, mainly Gazprom and RAO UES of Russia, and $62 billion comes from private companies, accounting for 25% of GDP.
In Western countries, whose experience is recognized by liberal thought as a “model” for Russia, the legislative limitation of monopoly and overconcentration of capital has become an independent branch of legal regulation, carried out mainly by federal laws. For example, in the United States, the so-called antitrust legislation, aimed at preventing excessive concentration of economic power in the hands of monopolies, has become a characteristic legal phenomenon. In particular, it is worth noting the Sherman Act, which, with reference to common law, declared illegal associations with the goal of monopolizing interstate and foreign trade of the United States. By the time of the actual introduction of the Sherman Act and a complex of subsequent legal acts (1941), according to some data, about 40% of capital was monopolized in the United States (in Russia, as we see, this figure is twice as high).
<...>
The process of concentration of capital during the reign of vladimir putin reached its culmination within the framework of the final monopolization <...>. Events and processes such as the auction for the privatization of 75% of the shares of the oil company Slavneft, the struggle for the redistribution of assets in the forestry industry (between the Basic Element FIG and the Ilim Pulp group), the struggle for leadership positions in OJSC Gazprom, an attack on management RAO UES of Russia against the background of the purchase of shares of the energy monopoly by affiliated structures of the owners of the Russian Aluminum group, as well as the struggle for control over the national television channels NTV and TVS, demonstrate that the key subject of the ruling layer is the owners of the Russian Aluminum financial and industrial group in cooperation with NK YUKOS and the Alfa Group consortium made a decisive attempt to monopolize a number of important resources of the country.
“Final monopolization” will be extrapolated into the political (control over the government, parties) and media spheres.
At the same time, the key subject of the ruling layer relies on exclusive political and administrative resources, including, but not limited to, special influence on the Prime Minister M. Kasyanov and the head of the Russian Presidential Administration A. Voloshin. The largest member of the ruling stratum is trying to assure the Kremlin that only he can be a reliable support of power in the long term, and therefore everything that happens is of exceptional importance on the eve of the parliamentary elections of 2003 and the presidential elections of 2004. To a large extent, this transformation is hampered not only by opponents of the owners of Russian Aluminum - Alfa Group - YUKOS in the ruling stratum, but also by the head of government himself, who, against the backdrop of the weakness of presidential power, grew into a self-sufficient political figure in 2001-2002. This means that if M. Kasyanov does not comply with the goals and logic of the final monopolization, the prime minister himself may become a victim of this process on the eve of the 2003 elections.
Rating of the fortunes of Russian oligarchs based on materials from Forbes magazine, changes compared to last year
A good idea of the dynamics of the concentration of oligarchic capital in Russia is given by the world-famous annual wealth ratings of Forbes magazine. In February 2003, Forbes once again published a list of the richest people on the planet in 2002. In Russia, according to the magazine, there are 17 people whose wealth exceeds $1 billion. In the summer of 2002, there were only 7 such people. Forbes magazine explains the appearance of 10 new Russian billionaires on the list by the rise in oil prices in 2002, as well as the medium-term upward trend in the Russian stock market.
The list of Russian billionaires, as last year, is headed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky (YUKOS), whose fortune is estimated at $8 billion (in 2001 - $3.7 billion). He took 26th place in the ranking of the richest people in the world (101st place in 2001). He is followed by Roman Abramovich (Sibneft, Russian Aluminum) with $5.7 billion (in 2001 - $3 billion), taking 49th place (in the summer of 2001 - 127th place). The fortune of Mikhail Fridman (Alfa Group) at the beginning of 2003 was estimated at $4.3 billion (in 2001 - $2.2 billion). It ranks 68th (191st in 2001). Viktor Vekselberg (TNK) was included in the Forbes list for the first time and immediately took 147th place with $2.5 billion. Vladimir Potanin (Norilsk Nickel), whose fortune has not changed since 2001 ($1.8 billion), climbed up the Forbes list from 234th to 222nd place. In 256th place is Mikhail Prokhorov (Norilsk Nickel), also on the Forbes list for the first time; his fortune last year was estimated by the magazine at $1.6 billion. Vladimir Evtushenkov (AFK Sistema) with $1.5 billion in 2002 year took 278th place in the Forbes list, in which he was mentioned for the first time. Oleg Deripaska (“Basic Element”, “Russian Aluminum”) - $1.5 billion in 2002 (in 2001 - $1.1 billion) - shares 278th place on the list with Yevtushenkov.
The most recent event within the framework of the monopolization strategy is the YUKOS-Sibneft megadeal.
On April 22, 2003, the heads of Yukos and Sibneft officially confirmed the merger of the companies. The merged company will be called YukosSibneft and will also likely use the YUKOS trademark. It is expected that the chairman of the board of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, will become the president of the merged company, and the current president of Sibneft, Evgeny Shvidler, will take the position of chairman of the board of directors. The capitalization of the new company is one and a half times greater than that of OJSC Gazprom - $35 billion. YukosSibneft will become the largest Russian oil business and will be among the top five global oil giants along with Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, BP Amoco and Shevron Texaco. As part of the transaction, the main shareholders of Sibneft (primarily R. Abramovich) will sell 20% of their shares in the company for $3 billion, and will also exchange their remaining shares based on the ratio of 0.36125 shares of YukosSibneft for one share of Sibneft. By combining the administrative resources of Sibneft shareholders, known for their lobbying capabilities and informal control over a number of government structures, Mikhail Khodorkovsky can pursue fairly ambitious long-term goals. Recently, many observers agree on Khodorkovsky's upcoming political career. This is indirectly evidenced by YUKOS's financing of the majority of parties vying for seats in the State Duma.
<...>
The post-Yeltsin state, while actually maintaining its commitment to liberal guidelines for socio-economic development, is simultaneously trying - at the level of declarations - to dissociate itself from the most odious manifestations of the previous stage of post-Soviet development. However, the real balance of power in our country allows oligarchic groups to extract the main advantages from the measures taken today to strengthen the state. First of all, it should be noted that:
strengthening the “vertical of power” actually reduced the feudal segmentation of economic and political life, but at the same time, first of all, cleared the way for oligarchic groups to seize profitable regional businesses, and reduced the ability of regional authorities to protect the businesses they care for from “hostile” takeovers.
the tax reform, having actually reduced the burden on the real sector of the economy, benefited primarily the basis of the oligarchy - super-large business, because It was most difficult for him to hide his expenses, especially wages. The biggest win for big capital was the reduction in income taxes with the exclusion of investment benefits - additional income was spent on the purchase of existing businesses, rather than on investments. In 2002, investments decreased threefold, and the government was forced to raise the issue of restoring investment benefits.
The history of the current tax reform began in May 2000. The author of the general concept of the reform was the Center for Strategic Research (G. Gref). Formally, the reform was initiated by a letter from Russian President vladimir putin to parliament, which outlined the stages of future reforms in the field of taxation. According to the schedule originally set by the president, the reform was to be completed by 2003–2004. Main conceptual points of the reform project:
“flat” income tax scale - 13%;
the proposed abolition of the turnover sales tax on January 1, 2004;
reduction of the single social tax by 5%;
transition from 2004 to the collection of VAT based on the principle of the country of destination (which should ease the situation of exporters to the CIS countries);
abolition of property tax benefits;
introduction of transport tax (from vehicle owners).
The very structure of the reform project clearly reveals the influence of super-large business: a unified income tax, low even for states with the most stringent neoliberal political regimes, a reduction in social tax, etc.
The current Russian government (the office of Mikhail Kasyanov) capitulates against any strengthening of state regulation in the economy under the pretext that this creates a field for corruption. At the same time, the possibility of increasing the efficiency of public administration, which could resist corruption, is not even considered. Thus, tariff regulation is practically not used to selectively stimulate the growth of the Russian economy. Industrial policy mechanisms that are widespread in the most liberal economies are not used.
Tariff regulation and industrial policy in some Western countries Industrial policy should address the following main problems (as classified by the Economic Commission for Europe):
reforms in the field of rule-making and legislative development (including problems of liberalization, deregulation;
social, labor and industrial legislation;
financial engineering, privatization);
ensuring the restructuring of specific industrial sectors (industrial restructuring, closure and conversion of defense industries, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, support for high-priority industries);
employment and productivity;
investments in tangible assets (industry, transport infrastructure, communications);
investments in intangible assets (industrial research and development, technology;
personnel training, including management;
quality improvement, environmentally friendly technologies;
development of standardization and statistics);
ensuring the competitiveness of industries/enterprises and the competitive environment (events in the domestic market;
export development and trade liberalization);
international investments;
environmental policy, industrial ecology;
industrial aspects of energy policy;
regional development;
industrial cooperation between developed countries and countries in transition.
The industrial policy of Mikhail Kasyanov’s cabinet (“the committee on oligarch affairs”) corresponds to a minimal extent with the positions of the above model. In such a situation, super-large business is trying to seize the initiative from the state to articulate the principles of industrial policy. In 2002, the Expert Council of the Committee of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Employers) (RSPP) on Industrial Policy was created. Currently, the Expert Council is developing a coordinated approach of large Russian businesses to the formulation of the industrial policy of the Russian Federation.
Judicial reform created the legal prerequisites for an equal, fair and impartial trial, but the state, primarily in the person of the presidential power, withdrew from the struggle for the implementation of adopted laws. Despite the presence of unjust sentences and decisions, since 2000 there has not been a single public dismissal of a judge. It is known that sanctions support norms, and without clear and strict sanctions, norms are inactive and eroded; In such a situation, the judicial system and law enforcement agencies are riddled with corruption and are closely intertwined with oligarchic mechanisms of power and influence.
“Managed democracy,” based on shadow manipulation of various elements of the state mechanism, discredits and dilutes legal forms of government, radically reduces the independence and responsibility of government bodies, places full responsibility for the functioning of the state as a whole on the president, and actually creates space for backroom deals and agreements in the interests of special pressure groups. The growing alienation of the state from its citizens reduces the political activity of the population, expands opportunities for political manipulation, and creates space for irresponsible manipulation of public opinion.
In 2001, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov officially announced that over the past four years the number of employees in federal executive bodies has decreased by 5%, while at the regional level the number of officials in executive structures has increased by 20% and “continues to increase.” Almost 90% of all state and municipal employees are employed in executive authorities. Over 6 years (1994–1999), their number increased from 894 thousand to 1029.5 thousand people, that is, by 15%. At the beginning of 2001, per 1000 people, there were 7 people employed in executive authorities at all levels. The composition of the bureaucratic corps is characterized by pronounced gender and age asymmetry. The pace of renewal of officials turned out to be very slow. Data indicate that the main “turnover” of personnel occurs in lower positions, while the top bureaucratic composition remains unchanged. As a result, the younger generation of officials has no incentive to stay in the public service for a long time, and older officials do not face visible competition both “from below” and from outside the bureaucracy.
<...>
Decline in political activity of the population
One of the problems that arise during election campaigns for regional authorities concerns the electoral activity of voters. It is significant both from the point of view of the level of civil responsibility and legal culture of voters, and in terms of establishing the legitimacy of state and municipal authorities formed through elections. In general, the downward trend in voter turnout from federal to regional elections continues; at the regional level - from the election of senior officials of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to the election of deputies of legislative bodies. Elections at the local government level show even lower turnout results. Experts name several reasons for this phenomenon: “fatigue” of voters from frequent election campaigns and excessive use of political technologies, a general decline in citizens’ interest in the institution and tools of elections, disbelief that the voter himself can change anything with the help of democratic procedures, etc.
A typical example of outright manipulation of public opinion, undermining trust in the very institution of expression of the people's will, is the recent referendum in Chechnya.
On March 23, 2003, a referendum was held in the Chechen Republic, during which the population of the republic approved the Constitution of Chechnya, the laws “On the election of the President of the Chechen Republic” and “On the election of deputies of the Chechen Parliament”. When asked about the Constitution of Chechnya, 96.5% of voters answered affirmatively; to questions about the President of Chechnya and the parliament of the republic, positive answers were given by 95% and 96% of referendum participants, respectively. The turnout was about 80%. The political meaning of the action is to preserve the “status quo” that has developed in the republic, legitimizing it with a plebiscite. Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent announcement of his intention to grant the republic broad autonomy played a role in attracting some moderate separatists to vote in favor of the adoption of the Constitution. Now the federal center also faces the task of holding elections for the president of the republic and parliament. It can be assumed that the negative aspects of the topic of Chechnya will be carefully removed from the Russian information space in the coming year, so as not to spoil the general background of the upcoming national elections of 2003–2004.
Thus, the capitulatory state, hiding behind liberal rhetoric, today does not even perform the functions of a “night watchman,” but clears the way for strengthening the omnipotence and influence of the oligarchs, implementing the doctrine of “final monopolization” and concentrating all levers of political power in the hands of the oligarchs.
V. Oligarchy at the present stage
In 2000–2003, the basis of the economic power of oligarchic groups was modified. After the 1998 default, their economic base became the giants of Soviet industry obtained during privatization. The oligarchs are firmly integrated into the real sector of the economy and are largely interested in creating macroeconomic conditions for its development.
The main source of excess income of the oligarchs is the appropriation of natural resource rent, which is formally a national treasure. The main economic strategy of oligarchic groups is the seizure or purchase of profitable businesses (the creation of new businesses is rather an exception) using administrative resources - close ties in government bodies and management, including direct intervention of “related” security forces.
An important new phenomenon was the formation of stable inter-oligarchic alliances (Basic Element + Sibneft + Alfa Group + YUKOS) - the creation of a core of political and economic influence, laying the preconditions for its radical strengthening - the formation of an oligarchy as a political system. Currently, the main directions for strengthening the influence of the oligarchs on all spheres of the country’s economic and political life have been determined.
Energy purchases - the struggle for the inclusion of regional energy companies in oligarchic groups; the ongoing mobilization of financial resources (including the TNK deal with British Petroleum, the takeover of Sibneft by YUKOS) can be considered as preparation for the privatization of energy systems; given the severe undervaluation of Russian energy, a new stage of privatization will lead to a sharp increase in the scale of oligarchic empires, a radical strengthening of oligarchic groups, and a change in the balance of power; the exclusion of the state energy monopoly RAO UES of Russia from the list of oligarchic groups and the transfer of its power to new owners will be an important step in establishing the oligarchy as the dominant force in the country.
In December 2002, a number of stock analysts stated through the media that they suspected affiliates of Oleg Deripaska, Roman Abramovich and Andrei Melnichenko of buying up shares of RAO UES of Russia. According to stock market participants, they may have about 20% of RAO shares at their disposal. At the same time, Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation Andrei Illarionov, at a forum in Boston (USA), made statements that frightened investors about the collapse in stock prices of RAO UES of Russia, which in fact rose in price by 43.5% in October-December 2002. At the beginning of December 2002, a version began to spread among stock market operators that the rise in quotations was caused by the purchase of the energy holding's securities on the order of certain oligarchic structures. As analysts and brokers admitted, the volume of trading in RAO shares on the MICEX was very significant, and for a number of reasons this was not an ordinary speculative game; the purchase of securities was carried out by a strategic Russian investor (a group of investors). The total volume of transactions, according to various estimates, reached $500 million (a stake of 15 to 20%), with Russian investors being the buyers, since the share of ADR owners was declining. Buyers of RAO shares declined to comment.
“Buying up” regions is the inclusion of subjects of the Russian Federation into oligarchic empires by “delegating” direct proteges of oligarchies to the leadership of regions (Tyumen, Krasnoyarsk, Khakassia, etc.) or establishing “exclusive” relations with the heads of regions.
Buying votes in federal legislative bodies - establishing “trusting” relationships with a number of State Duma deputies, delegating direct representatives of oligarchic groups to the Federation Council, which in many ways turned the upper house into a “council of oligarchic-regional empires”; the creation of “shadow” and open (RSPP) lobbying structures that express the interests of both individual oligarchic groups and the oligarchy (conclave) as a whole.
Oligarchic groups and lobbying: the big picture
The connections of oligarchic groups with power structures at the federal and regional levels are well known. Many people from financial industrial groups ended up in the pool of top federal officials. Thus, former managers of Alfa Group Alexander Abramov and Vladislav Surkov became deputy heads of the presidential administration in 1999. The government of the Russian Federation has become a place of struggle between old and new political sub-elite groups and businesses associated with them. The new, non-governor Federation Council, formed by 2002, was directly recruited from large and super-large businesses. The State Duma of the Russian Federation is one of the main lobbying platforms. There is a colossal oil lobby in the State Duma; large commodity companies not only enjoy significant, often decisive influence on the main factions/groups, but also completely control informal deputy communities of 20–30 people each.
<...>
"Acquisto" di spazio politico - il completamento dell'istituzione del controllo finanziario sull'intero spettro dei partiti politici: dall'Unione delle forze di destra e Yabloko alla Russia Unita e al Partito Comunista della Federazione Russa; i dati sul controllo oligarchico sul processo politico pubblico nella Russia moderna sono forniti nel rapporto SNA "Rischi e minacce per la Russia nel 2003".
Oggi, i seguenti costrutti politici sono nella zona di controllo diretto del soggetto chiave dello strato dominante (Basic Element + Sibneft + Alfa Group + Yukos):
Partito popolare russo;
il partito Yabloko (ingegnato da un soggetto chiave per fornire una "copertura" politica e di immagine alla guerra contro A. Chubais).
Nella zona di controllo parziale del soggetto chiave dello strato dominante ci sono:
il partito "Russia Unita" (c'è una lotta per il suo controllo con la "squadra di Leningrado");
Partito Comunista della Federazione Russa (il controllo è mediato da NK YUKOS; inoltre, alcune figure paracomuniste sono nella zona di influenza, in particolare S. Glazyev);
Unione delle forze di Destra (SPS) (c'è una lotta competitiva per il controllo di questo partito tra il soggetto chiave, da un lato, e il gruppo di A. Chubais, dall'altro);
conservazione dei rapporti "esclusivi" con gli organi statali - nonostante la proclamazione del principio di "equidistanza", i gruppi oligarchici hanno mantenuto i loro protetti a tutti i livelli di governo (si veda il rapporto SNA "Il grande gioco in Russia: soggetti della strategia nazionale" );
una nuova nomenklatura è emersa dagli alti funzionari governativi "vicini", le cui posizioni sono sostenute dall'influenza dell'oligarchia e dei media a loro strettamente associati;
di conseguenza, la nuova nomenklatura è protetta in modo affidabile da valutazioni reali dell'efficacia delle sue azioni, le tradizionali minacce alla sua posizione, implicite nella democrazia storica, sono notevolmente ridotte;
trasformazione della “verticale del potere”: il sistema di potere implicito, basato sulla vicinanza e lealtà al presidente come arbitro supremo, garante della convenzione delle élite, il sovrano, dotato dalla Costituzione russa di poteri eccezionalmente ampi, è stato trasformato in una "mano libera per gli oligarchi" nel sequestro di proprietà (ad esempio, uno scontro violento per il controllo della gestione di Slavneft, il conflitto tra il gruppo finanziario e industriale Bazel e Ilim Pulp, ecc.) e inoltre - la manipolazione di energia. La convenzione - il sistema delle regole del gioco [del periodo yeltsiniano] - è stata sostituita da una pseudo-convenzione che stabilisce una misura di disconoscimento della legge dipendente dal potere politico ed economico disponibile (ad esempio, lo stallo nel conflitto tra i gruppi "Leningrado" e "Famiglia" attorno al "caso delle Tre Balene", quando le azioni di un investigatore speciale nominato personalmente dal presidente si sono concluse nel nulla); il presidente, nell'ambito di questa pseudo-convenzione, non è più dotato delle funzioni/diritti di arbitro e, quindi, si può affermare, è un'istituzione più debole che durante il regno di Boris Yeltsin; Il risultato logico della situazione che si è sviluppata nel 2000-2003 è stato l'inizio dell'attuazione di un progetto per cambiare la struttura statale e garantire l'unione personale del grande capitale e del potere - vedi Capitolo VII.
Con il pretesto di una tesi di “equidistanza”, in assenza di regole del gioco statali, gli oligarchi stabiliscono regole private che determinano sempre più le condizioni reali della vita politica ed economica, e quindi l'instabilità che caratterizza ogni periodo di non- convenzione.
“Purchase” of political space - completion of the establishment of financial control over the entire spectrum of political parties: from the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko to United Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation; data on oligarchic control over the public political process in modern Russia are given in the SNA report “Risks and Threats for Russia in 2003.”
Today, the following political structures are in the zone of direct control of the key subject of the ruling layer (Basic Element + Sibneft + Alfa Group + YUKOS):
Narodnaya Partia (People's Party of Russia);
the Yabloko party (engaged by a key entity to provide political and image “cover” for the war against A. Chubais).
In the zone of partial control of the key subject of the ruling layer there are:
the United Russia party (there is a struggle for control over it with the “Leningrad team”);
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (control is mediated by NK YUKOS; in addition, some paracommunist figures are in the zone of influence, in particular S. Glazyev);
Union of Right Forces (SPS) (there is a competitive struggle for control over this party between the key entity, on the one hand, and the group of A. Chubais, on the other);
maintaining “exclusive” relations with government bodies - despite the proclamation of the principle of “equidistance”, oligarchic groups retained their henchmen at all levels of government (see the NSC report “The Great Game in Russia: Subjects of National Strategy”); a new nomenklatura has emerged from “close” senior government officials, whose positions are supported by the influence of the oligarchy and the media closely associated with them; as a result, the new nomenklatura is reliably protected from real assessments of the effectiveness of its actions, the traditional threats to its position implied by historical democracy are significantly reduced;
transformation of the “vertical of power”: the implied system of power, based on closeness and loyalty to the president as the supreme arbiter, the guarantor of the convention of elites, the ruler endowed by the Russian Constitution with exceptionally broad powers, was transformed into “free hands for the oligarchs” in the seizure of property (for example, forceful confrontation for control over the management of Slavneft, the conflict between the Basel financial and industrial group and Ilim Pulp, etc.) and further - manipulation of power. The convention - the system of rules of the game [of the Yeltsin period] - was replaced by a pseudo-convention, establishing the extent of ignoring the law depending on the available political and economic power (for example, the stalemate in the conflict between the “Leningrad” and “family” groups around the “Three Whales” case, when the actions of a special investigator personally appointed by the president ended in nothing); the president, within the framework of this pseudo-convention, is no longer endowed with the functions/rights of an arbiter and therefore, it can be stated, is a weaker institution than during the reign of Boris Yeltsin; The logical result of the situation that developed in 2000–2003 was the beginning of the implementation of a project to change the state structure and ensure a personal union of big capital and power - see section VII.
Under the cover of the thesis of "equidistance" in the absence of rules of the game established by the state, the oligarchs establish private rules that increasingly determine the real conditions of political and economic life and, consequently, the instability characteristic of any period of absence of a convention.
VI. Oligarchic modernization: historical role and consequences for Russia
When assessing the role of oligarchic modernization in the modern (post-Soviet) history of Russia, it should be taken into account that oligarchic groups made a significant contribution to the integration of our country into the world economy; they provide the bulk of domestic investment today. Oil companies have ensured a significant reduction in the cost of produced oil, thereby reducing the dependence of the country's economy on global conditions. Orders from raw material companies ensured some increase in the workload of the domestic mechanical engineering industry compared to the 90s of the 20th century. Oligarchic groups today are largely the initiators of further liberalization of the domestic economy.
However, as the National Strategy Council has pointed out before (see the report “Risks and Threats for Russia in 2003”), the oligarchic class has not become either a nationally responsible or socially responsible elite in Russia. In this regard, oligarchic modernization has always been based on the interests of:
maximizing the profits of oligarchs - owners of large industries;
maximizing the market capitalization of oligarch-owned corporations;
legalization of capital and other resources of oligarchs in the USA and Western European countries
and never from the strategic interests of Russia as a geostrategic and ethnocultural entity.
Because of this, oligarchic modernization is inextricably linked with a complex of negative factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
the structure of the Russian economy as a result of oligarchic modernization is shifting towards raw materials and transit;
in the process of modernization, the decline in the intellectual and technological potential of the nation is underestimated and/or completely ignored;
the role and place of the military-industrial complex is ignored not only as the supporting structure of the Soviet economy, but also as an important element of the geostrategic evolution of the country;
the main source of corruption and erosion of state functioning - the oligarchs' open violation of legal norms - sets examples of a nihilistic attitude towards the state and stimulates illegal activity in economic life;
undermining equal opportunities: oligarchs consistently oppose the establishment of equal rules for doing business for all; they widely use their influence in government bodies at the federal and regional levels when conducting competition and receiving large orders <...>;
conservation of the “raw materials” nature of development - the oligarchs have shown themselves to be exemplary invaders of profitable businesses, good managers of existing industries, but weak creators of new businesses and, in general, anti-innovators. Historical experience and economic theory show that within large oligarchic structures with bureaucratic management procedures, entrepreneurial risks and innovations are suppressed. The experience of the last four years shows that the structure of investment activity of oligarchs reproduces the existing structure of the economy and its technological degradation.
<...>
VII. Oligarchic coup
At the beginning of 2003, a new trend was identified in the system of relations between the “oligarchy and the state.” The oligarchs came to the conclusion that now, after the completion of primary privatization, the institution of the presidency is no longer so much a guarantor of the stability of the ruling layer as a potential source of a vague threat to it. At the same time, a conclusion was made about the qualitative “final” ineffectiveness of the current political elite as a source of managerial personnel for the country. In this regard, representatives of the key subject of the ruling layer (also see above) came to the conclusion that it was necessary to ensure a personal union of power and super-large business. That is, the direct promotion of oligarchs to key government positions.
Since the institution of the president, from the point of view of the ruling layer, has fulfilled its historical mission and is therefore no longer needed (in the future it is rather dangerous, due to the extremely broad formal powers of the head of state, potentially allowing for adjustments to the basic philosophy and technology of power), and also since the oligarchs as individuals do not have public political resources to win direct national elections, the key subject of the ruling layer decided to limit the powers of the President of the Russian Federation and transform Russia from a presidential republic into a presidential-parliamentary one (quasi-French model). The main ideologist of such a transformation is the head of NK YUKOS (YukosSibneft) Mikhail Khodorkovsky, he is explicitly and implicitly supported by other key figures of the oligarchic pool (R. Abramovich, O. Deripaska, M. Friedman).
The transformation of the state structure requires the introduction of certain changes to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. These changes, according to the existing oligarchic plan, can be ensured already in 2004 by the State Duma controlled by super-large business (the new composition of the lower house of parliament, which will be elected in December 2003) and the overwhelming majority of legislative assemblies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, from the point of view of the plan, the loyalty of the State Duma will be ensured by the system of interaction between the oligarchs and the main parties, and the loyalty of the parliaments of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation will be ensured by the level of influence of oligarchic financial-industrial groups on the economies of the regions.
According to the project of the key subject of the ruling layer, a new government of the Russian Federation, controlled and accountable to parliament, can be formed as early as 2004. Mikhail Khodorkovsky is considered the priority candidate for the role of chairman of such a government formed in accordance with the new Constitution. However, it cannot be ruled out that the president of YukosSibneft is just a false panel, and within a year the key entity will announce a new candidate for the post of prime minister.
Members of the National Strategy Council have traditionally advocated strengthening public control over the executive branch and creating additional levers of public and transparent influence on the president’s decisions. Because of this, we do not deny that formally a presidential-parliamentary republic is in many ways more effective than a presidential one. However, in conditions when there are almost no real political parties in the country, the institutions of civil society are in their infancy or in a rut, the main systems of mass communications are controlled by oligarchs, it cannot be said that a radical transformation of the power machine meets the interests of Russia and its people. Rather, we are talking about further weakening the dependence of the oligarchs (the ruling layer) on any external institutions and objective interests of the country/nation. Limiting the powers of the president at the current historical stage will mean a transfer of power directly to super-large business, free from any real control. It should also be noted that Russia does not have positive historical experience of parliamentarism.
In fact, we can talk about the prospect of an oligarchic coup in Russia.
VIII. Prospects for leaving the trajectory of “oligarchic modernization”
It is necessary to take into account the extreme limitation of historical time to change the nature of the country's development. If the oligarchy is not stopped now, then time will be lost for the effective modernization of the country, based on the use of its significant natural, industrial and intellectual potential. Continuing the course of oligarchic modernization (quasi-modernization) will lead to the loss of Russia’s industrial and educational potential, the creation of which cost the country and the nation so much. Recreating these potentials within the framework of the course being implemented today is no longer realistic.
Returning to the experience of the Venetian Republic, we can recall its fate under oligarchic rule.
First, after the opening of new transit routes, Venice lost its status as an exclusive transport corridor between Europe and Asia. A similar fate may await Russia already in the current decade as a result of the actions of the “anti-terrorist coalition” led by the United States in the post-Soviet space. Further, Venice lost remote territories (Cyprus, Crete, Russian analogues - Primorye, Kaliningrad region).
Finally, in 1797, the Republic of Venice ceased to exist, having been absorbed into the empire of Napoleon Bonaparte.
The course of “oligarchic modernization” directs the country to a dead end - maintaining the dominance of the oligarchy deprives the country of prospects for state-political and socio-economic development, leading it to backwardness, socio-political degradation and state collapse. The oligarchic coup completely fits into the logic of this course (see Section VII).
Departure from the trajectory of “oligarchic modernization”, limiting the influence of the oligarchy on all aspects of the state-political and socio-economic life of the country cannot imply the liquidation of large financial and industrial holdings, their exclusion from the economic life of the country. This would lead to a decrease in the country's competitiveness on world markets and production efficiency in key sectors of the Russian economy.
The national task is to deprive the oligarchs of unjustified influence on the development of the country, super-profits, opportunities for shadow influence on government bodies and management at all levels, as well as political parties, the intellectual environment, and the expert community.
An important resource in reducing the influence of the oligarchy is their own activity. First of all, their disunity, the incessant inter-oligarchic wars. There is a clear tendency to unite the oligarchs of the group that strives for dominance or acquires excessive influence. Also, the decline in the influence of oligarchs is facilitated by the degrading impact that they have on the media they own, on those parties, movements and organizations where they acquire predominant influence.
As historical experience shows, limiting the influence of the oligarchy and transforming big business into an effective, socially responsible part of the social organism can be ensured only on the basis of a fundamental change in the functions of the state.
Solving the problem of changing the nature of the country's development requires a radical strengthening of the Russian state, which meets the interests of the fair, dynamic and effective development of the country. In fact, the cultivation of a new state.
It should be taken into account that in solving this problem it is difficult to count on the modern state apparatus, the bureaucracy as a whole. This apparatus at the level of the federation and its subjects is too infected with the inertia of “nomenklatura” management and corruption, and is interested in preserving its privileges. These elements of the state apparatus strive, with the exception of only its individual representatives, to block fundamental changes in the functioning of the state apparatus.
One should not count on a radical change in the situation as a result of the Kremlin's planned and absolutely necessary reform of public administration. Some increase in operational efficiency will not change the nature of the public administration system, its priority conditionality by the interests of the oligarchy.
A real alternative is to cultivate an effective state capable of solving the problem of changing the nature of socio-political development, searching for support in the formation of new state guidelines and corresponding social mechanisms.
The social prerequisites for such a historical turn are:
turning the widely and correctly understood problem of increasing the efficiency of the state into a subject of active public discussion;
creation of a broad public coalition of forces interested in limiting the influence of the oligarchy.
An analysis of the social forces that could support the socio-political turn under consideration shows that public organizations and initiatives - the traditional pillars of civil society - cannot yet serve as a reliable support for the formation of state institutions. The traditions of opposition to the state have not yet been eliminated; civil society organizations are too concentrated in a few economic and political centers of the country.
In Russian conditions, as studies have shown, a certain managerial potential has accumulated at the level of local government. These elements, due to their close proximity to voters and small and medium-sized businesses, have significant political potential and strive to improve their status.
Large and medium-sized businesses are also objectively interested in limiting the influence of the oligarchy, increasing the efficiency of the state apparatus, and ensuring a truly equal and impartial court. At the same time, these groups are extremely vulnerable to attacks from oligarchs and the state apparatus. Because of this, such forces today prefer to act using “shadow” technologies and establish strong relationships with regional authorities. These groups are ready to support the anti-oligarchic actions of political forces, primarily regional authorities, often without engaging in open struggle.
A significant part of representatives of government bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, primarily their leaders, seek to reduce the influence of oligarchic groups and the federal “nomenklatura”. Today, the movement for the development of effective federalism, a clear delineation of rights and responsibilities between the federation and the constituent entities, and the expansion of regional independence is part of the general movement to increase the efficiency of the state.
A separate important segment of the cultivation of the state is the cultural legitimation of statehood and the formation of a new intellectual elite, with which the authorities should be in a direct mutually enriching dialogue. In this segment, the role of a nationally oriented expert community is extremely important.
The transformation of the Russian state will require considerable time. However, the initiation of such a process is urgent.
An important impetus in the discussed transformation of the state would be a demonstration of the possibility of effective functioning of the state, at least through individual examples. This will counteract the systematic discrediting of the state carried out by media that continue dissident traditions or are associated with oligarchs, and will give confidence to those who sincerely strive for an effective state. The technology of nurturing the state involves the establishment of small government agencies designed to carry out clearly defined local government functions and created under the personal responsibility of specific individuals. In such small structures, mechanisms and procedures for effective public administration can be developed, without oligarchic influence. As a result of the use of such technologies, a cadre of real reformers may appear who will actually prove the possibility of an effective state functioning; these successful reformers will now be able to gain a public mandate to govern at a higher level.
It is quite obvious that a departure from the trajectory of “oligarchic modernization” in the near future is by no means guaranteed, this is only a historical chance for Russia, but this chance must be taken advantage of.
Donate to support my work and to read more translation, become a Patron https://www.patreon.com/freedomfiles
Thank you!
Who helped putin? Alexey Navalny on the role of Switzerland in storing stolen money
WHO CREATED putin? ENG / ITA / RUS: Who helped, lobbied, collaborated, still helping, still collaborating and still sponsoring chekist regime? Russian Opposition: Who, What and How ENG/ ITA/ RUS: The History of Protests, Soviet Dissidents and Opposition Leaders.
Kremlin vs. Opposition: 100 Russian political prisoners
WHO CREATED putin? ENG / ITA / RUS: Who helped, lobbied, collaborated, still helping, still collaborating and still sponsoring chekist regime? - List of 40+ articles from different authors, newspapers, countries Russian Opposition: Who, What and How
Kremlin vs. Opposition: 200 Russian Political Prisoners
WHO CREATED putin? ENG / ITA / RUS: Who helped, lobbied, collaborated, still helping, still collaborating and still sponsoring chekist regime? Russian Opposition: Who, What and How ENG/ ITA/ RUS: The History of Protests, Soviet Dissidents and Opposition Leaders.