USSR - Europe: When Paris and the Kremlin planned control and dominion over other countries
Public demagoguery and secret agreements on how to suppress "freedom love" under the guise of fighting natural disasters (!-the prototype of climatechangism) and prevent the growth of strong countries
Mikhail Gorbachev e Francois Mitterrand / Mikhail Gorbachev e Margaret Thatcher
13 years after the publication of this interview, in the midst of a war in Europe, I propose to re-read and rethink the imperial ambitions of European politicians. As well as their long and hypocritical tradition of disregard for human rights (for example, under the slogan of pacifism promoted by the Komintern), which we observed all these 22 years of their profitable collaboration with the KGBstan.
We must not forget or ignore the fact that it was exactly the France - the largest supplier of weapons to the chekist regime (after 2014, bypassing sanctions for the annexation of Crimea, weapons that were also used in the Donbass against Ukrainians) the regime which also killed Chechens, killed Russians, killed Ukrainians and Syrians with the tacit approval and consent of the major part of world politicians.
Full translation of the article:
Молодой британский историк Павел Строилов «взломал» кремлевские архивы
| Галина Аккерман интервью с Павлом Строиловым | RFI | 17.09.2009 |
http://www1.rfi.fr/acturu/articles/117/article_4208.asp
НА РУССКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ - СССР - Европа: Когда Париж и Кремль планировали совместный контроль и господство над другими странами
VERSIONE IN ITALAINO - URSS - Europa: Quando Parigi e il Cremlino pianificarono il controllo e il dominio su altri paesi
Young British historian Pavel Stroilov "hacked" the Kremlin archives
A few years ago, a young British historian, Pavel Stroilov, worked in the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, where copies of all Politburo documents from the perestroika period were kept. On the advice of the former Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, he managed to copy about 1,000 secret documents, which have now again become completely inaccessible to researchers. The other day, these sensational documents became the property of the British newspaper The Times. It appears from the documents that neither British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher nor French President Francois Mitterrand were interested in the collapse of the Soviet Union or the reunification of Germany. Mitterrand even suggested to his friend Gorbachev that a Franco-Soviet brigade should be created in order to prevent the unification of the two Germanys.
Pavel Stroilov comments on these unique documents in a conversation with Galina Akkerman, a journalist from the French Radio International RFI.
— Pavel, you managed to "export" these valuable documents to the West. Under what conditions did you receive them?
- Fortunately, the documents were scanned and were in the form of digital files in the Gorbachev Foundation. Of course, for researchers, access to them was limited, half of the documents were not shown at all. And it was possible to copy something only with the personal permission of Gorbachev. But this is a purely technical task - to turn limited access into unlimited. I figured out how their local network works, how Internet access works, and I sent the documents first to myself by e-mail, and then forwarded them to several reliable places in the West.
And after I sent the documents, I myself left. By the way, it turned out that I did the right thing. Soon, in 2003, the Kremlin ordered the Gorbachev Foundation to stop showing these documents to anyone. After all, the originals are stored in the Kremlin archive and have never been declassified.
- It's great that you managed to do it. I read in the British press that you copied about 1,000 documents: not only official minutes, but also records of confidential conversations between Soviet and Western leaders.
Among these sensational documents are records relating to a meeting between Margaret Thatcher and Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in September 1989, some 20 years ago. At that time, it was already obvious that the socialist camp was collapsing. What position did Margaret Thatcher take regarding the Warsaw Pact and changes in the USSR?
- She came from an unexpected position. She declared that the West was not interested in the unification of Germany, that it would not help the decommunization of Europe and would not promote any changes that threatened the existence and stability of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. I emphasize: she made it clear that this is not only the position of Great Britain, but of the entire West.
She is very clear: we will understand your position if you allow changes in Eastern Europe only to the extent that does not jeopardize the existence of the Warsaw Pact.
- I'd like to play the devil's advocate. Perhaps she spoke in such a way as to reassure Gorbachev, while at the same time the British Foreign Office gave some other signals to the reformers in Eastern Europe? Little did she say! She even said that she admired the courage and patriotism of the then Polish leader, Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was about to be tried in Poland. Perhaps all this was just rhetoric?
- Of course, there was an element of rhetoric in it. I doubt that Thatcher loved Jaruzelski very much. Nevertheless, she made such a statement. It's uncomfortable to read today.
- The most striking thing is the attitude of Margaret Thatcher, as if a model of Western political and economic liberalism, to the unification of Germany.
- Margaret Thatcher should not be judged too harshly. At that time, all world leaders were against the immediate unification of Germany, in the form in which it really happened. But unlike the others, Thatcher talked about it publicly. She had a rather naive position, she still proceeded from the traumatism of the Second World War. She feared a strong Germany and a redrawing of borders in Europe.
However, when the question of a possible neutrality of Germany or its entry into NATO and at the same time into the Warsaw Pact came up later (Gorbachev insisted on this with the support of Mitterrand), she took a completely Western position, that is, that a united Germany should be a free democratic state, a member of NATO. She did not accept any compromises.
- From what has already been published, Gorbachev's attitude towards Eastern European leaders is striking. He dreamed of a common European home and actually despised his colleagues in the socialist camp.
- It is difficult to say what was in his head, but it is certain that he was plotting to overthrow these leaders. In particular, he intrigued against Honecker and Ceausescu. There is evidence that Moscow was also behind the "velvet revolution" in Czechoslovakia, as a result of which Yakes was overthrown. But Gorbachev singled out Jaruzelsky and considered him a completely suitable Polish leader for the Common European House. He replaced the rest, but events got out of Moscow's control. And as a result, it was by no means Gorbachev's henchmen who came to power in a number of socialist countries.
- The Times quotes, with reference to your documents, Shevardnadze, the then foreign minister, as proposing to tear down the Berlin Wall ourselves. I understand that the unification of Germany did not frighten Gorbachev, because he hoped for the creation of a common European home. And within this house, one Germany or two, what's the difference? Do I understand correctly?
- Quite right. The main question was not the unification of Germany in itself, but when, how and on whose terms it would happen. According to Gorbachev's plan, the unification of Germany was to take place gradually, within the framework of the unification of Europe, under the auspices of the "mildly socialist" Common European House. Mitterrand supported him in this. Yes, and with other Eastern European leaders, negotiations were conducted on the gradual opening of borders.
East Germans could begin to travel to the FRG on the sly, of course, with the preservation of the visa regime. As for the Berlin Wall, its demolition seemed inevitable. It was impossible to speak of the end of the Cold War while keeping its symbol in the center of Europe. After all, it was a disgusting embodiment of the "Iron Curtain". It's just that events got out of hand when millions of people took to the streets...
- You found documents according to which Mitterrand even proposed the creation of joint French-Russian armed brigades, under the pretext of fighting natural disasters, in order to stop the unification of Germany. Such a Franco-Soviet Ministry of Emergency Situations in the fight against love-for-freedom.
- This is an entry in the diary of Chernyaev, who was Gorbachev's main assistant in international affairs. Chernyaev records that such a proposal came from Jacques Attali, who served as the same adviser under Mitterrand. This was in October 1989. Chernyaev writes that Zagladin went on a business trip to France and that the entire French political elite, including even the mayors of large cities, is against the unification of Germany.
- In general, Attali spoke decisively. He stated that he was ready to move to Mars if the unification of Germany took place. What explains such fear? Legacy of World War II? Misunderstanding of modern Germany? Still, Helmut Kohl did not look like a man who intended to revive Nazism.
- Mitterrand did not share the naive ideas of Margaret Thatcher, although he spoke of German "revanchism". But as his conversations with Gorbachev "behind closed doors" make clear, it was a demagogic device to mobilize public opinion in Western countries. And his real plan, together with Gorbachev, concerned the creation of a single European superpower with a socialist bias. He thought that Moscow and Paris would jointly manage this super-national association.
Mitterrand speaks directly to Gorbachev about these two poles of the new confederation, which will jointly control Eastern Europe and Germany. Therefore, he did not want the unification of Germany to happen quickly and on Western terms.
It was a question of power. A free, rather right-wing, powerful united Germany could not be brought under control. And Mitterrand wanted Germany to give up many of its sovereign powers in exchange for unification.
On July 4, 1989, Gorbachev visited France. And Mitterand directly told Gorbachev that the union between Russia and France was not only historical.
We will soon have to deal with the German question together, declared the French President. At one time it was resolved through violence, and now we, they say, will solve it harmoniously.
- Former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, who read the Times article, said there was no need to exaggerate. Thatcher and Mitterrand said, they say, today is one thing, and tomorrow another. In short, Vedrin is trying to reduce the level of explosiveness of sensational documents. At the same time, French Secretary of State for European Affairs Pierre Lelouch acknowledges that these revelations may even lead to some cooling of relations between France and Germany. Are you aware of the German reactions to the publication in The Times?
- Not yet, although I have already been approached for an interview by the editors of the Stern magazine.
- Have you published these documents in Russian and are you going to publish them in other languages?
- Over the past years, Vladimir Bukovsky and myself have been working tirelessly. Trying to publish these Kremlin archives. But it's not that easy. Right now we have published only a few documents, and immediately such a big, brilliant politician as Margaret Thatcher has his "skeleton in the closet". Can you imagine what kind of skeletons Mitterrand, Attali or even Bush senior will find?
Therefore, there is great resistance from the political and academic establishment to the publication of these sources. It's almost like Russian opposition to "attempts to falsify history." We still hope that we have now made a breach. By the way, many of these documents have already been published in Russian, albeit with cuts, by the Gorbachev Foundation itself. When they realized there was a leak, they published one or two collections themselves. We are thinking how to publish these documents entirely in Russian, but our main task is to publish them in the West. There is much more interest in history in Russia, and they know more about the Gorbachev period than here.